Supreme Court Third Petty Bench Decision of January 24, 1995, 49 Minshu 1-25, 1519 Hanji 87, 872 Hanta 186. The Court narrowly interpreted Civil Code Article 714, reversing and remanding a lower court decision which had imposed liability on the guardian of two juveniles who had caused a fire in an abandoned warehouse. Civil Code Article 714 imposes liability for the acts of those lacking legal capacity upon their guardians except where the guardian can be shown not to have been negligent in supervision of the incompetent. Despite an absence of evidence relating to negligent supervision, the lower court had considered that a determination of the negligence of the guardian may be based in part on the grossly negligent nature of the juveniles’ conduct. The Court disagreed, ruling that a determination of the negligence of the guardian must be based solely on the nature of the guardian’s supervision.

Supreme Court Third Petty Bench Decision of January 23, 1996, 50 Minshu 1-1, 1561 Hanji 57, 914 Hanta 106. The Court reversed and remanded a lower court determination (Nagoya High Court Decision of October 31, 1991, 50 Minshu 1-115) regarding the applicable medical standard of care. On September 25, 1974, the plaintiff, a seven year old boy, was admitted to the defendant hospital after having been diagnosed with an acute appendicitis. At 4:32 p.m., the defendant supervising surgeon, who was assisted by three nurses and supported by an additional assisting nurse on an on-call basis, directed the administration of 1.2 milliliters of the narcotic Percamin S. During and immediately after the administration of the narcotic, no extraordinary fluctuation in the plaintiff’s blood pressure or heart rate. Upon initiation of the surgical procedure shortly thereafter, the defendant surgeon requested that the plaintiff’s heart rate and blood pressure be checked every five minutes and report any significant fluctuations. At 4:45 p.m., a weakening of the plaintiff’s heart rate was reported, the plaintiff lost consciousness, his face was pale and symptoms of cyanosis were obvious. The supervising surgeon then immediately called for assistance and initiated emergency measures, and although assisted by two additional physicians, at 4:48 p.m., the plaintiff’s heart stopped. However, as result of the emergency measures, shortly before 4:55 p.m., the patient’s heart started beating again, the plaintiff regained consciousness and the surgical procedure was completed. As a result of the operation, the plaintiff suffered significant loss of brain function, and, along with his parents, asserted claims against the supervising surgeon and the hospital for negligence in the prescription and administration of Percamin S, and mishandling of the operation and subsequent emergency measures. The lower court found the procedure to have been conducted in a manner consistent with current medical practice, and not in violation of the medical duty of care, absolving the defendants of all liability. The sole activity which the lower court noted as a potential breach of the medical duty of care was the supervising physician’s order to check the plaintiff’s blood pressure and heart rate every five minutes rather than every two minutes, as recommended in the documentation accompanying Percamin S. However, the lower court found no causal connection between this breach and the damages ultimately caused to the plaintiff. Reversing, the Court acknowledged that while the determination of the applicable medical standard of care is not uniform in each case, but must include an assessment of standard medical practices in similar geographic areas, the nature of the medical facility and the specialty of the treating physician, a physician fails to comply with procedures and practices recommended with respect to narcotics used in surgical procedures must necessarily amount to a breach of the standard of care. Because it cannot be said that the defendants’ failure to undertake these procedures prevented earlier diagnosis or mitigation of the plaintiff’s condition, the defendant’s breach of the duty of care bore a causal link to the presence and severity of the plaintiff’s condition.

Supreme Court Third Petty Bench Decision of March 26, 1996, 50 Minshu 4-993, 1563 Hanji 126. The Court affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of claims of a jilted spouse. Shortly after their marriage in 1967, relations between the plaintiff wife and her husband began to deteriorate. By 1980, the plaintiff’s husband had ceased to return home for days at a time, the plaintiff continued to refuse his requests for divorce. In 1984, after her husband was promoted to serve as representative director of another employer, the plaintiff feared an increase in the debt obligations of the marital community and requested separation of marital assets. Finally, in 1986, the plaintiff’s husband petitioned the Family Court for an order of separation and mediation of marital disputes. However, the plaintiff failed to appear for the mediation, and the petition was ultimately withdrawn. In 1987, the plaintiff’s husband rented an apartment under the name of his employer and began living there with the defendant a female co-worker. In 1989, the plaintiff’s husband and the defendant gave birth to a child, and the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for mental suffering stemming from the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff’s husband. The Court, dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal, pointed out that, absent special circumstances, where the marital relationship has already disintegrated, a third party cannot be held liable in tort for engaging in sexual relations with one of the spouses.