Supreme Court Third Petty Bench Decision of March 7, 1995, 49 Minshu 3-687, 1525 Hanji 34, 876 Hanta 84. The Court reversed the appeal of a group which had applied for a permit to use a municipal hall to hold the "National Assembly in Opposition to the Kansai International Airport." The municipal authorities had refused the permit based on regulations allowing for refusal where there is "a recognition of interference with the management of the facility." The municipal authorities were concerned about potential misconduct associated with a planned demonstration by the group and the potential for counter-demonstrations. The Court found the regulations constitutional and the refusal to grant the permit appropriate.

Supreme Court First Petty Bench Decision of April 13, 1995, 49 Keishu 4-619. The Court reversed and remanded the Tokyo High Court's dismissal of an action against a defendant who had imported obscene goods solely for personal use as not in violation of Customs Tariff Law Article 109. Article 109 broadly prohibits the import of commodities injurious to the public. The Tokyo High Court had interpreted Article 109 as limited by Criminal Code Article 175 which only prohibits the sale, distribution, and exhibition of such materials, but contains no specific prohibition against mere ownership. (Tokyo High Court Decision of July 13, 1994). The Court held that the literal terms of Customs Tariff Law Article 109 prohibited the importation of all obscene materials, including those for personal use, and that such a prohibition violated neither Article 13 nor Article 31 of the Constitution.

Supreme Court First Petty Bench Decision of July 6, 1995, 1542 Hanji 134, 888 Hanta 100. The Court ruled that the disciplinary dismissal of two officials of the Japan Self Defense Force who, while in uniform, had read a document allegedly slanderous of the Japan's Self Defense Force at a political assembly did not violate Article 21 of the Constitution. Specifically, the Court determined that restriction of the official's freedom of expression in the form of dismissal was "a necessary and reasonable action for the protection of the public benefit."

Supreme Court Second Petty Bench Decision of March 15, 1996, 50 Minshu 3-549,  1563 Hanji 102.  The Court reversed and remanded a ruling of the Tokyo High Court (Tokyo High Court Decision of March 30, 1993, 150 Minshu 3-604) which had affirmed municipal authorities’ denial of an application for use of a municipal welfare hall.  The applicant, a coalition of labor unions associated with the Japan National Railroad, sought to use the municipal hall for the purpose of holding memorial services for a murdered coalition official.  At the time, press reports suggested that the official’s death was a result of internal disputes within the coalition.  In denying the coalition’s application, the municipal authorities relied on Section 6(1)(a) of the Regulations Regarding the Management and Operation of Municipal Facilities, which authorized denial of applications where "it is recognized that interference with the management and operation of the facility will occur."  Specifically, the municipal authorities’ refusal was based on (i) a likelihood of a disturbance caused by an attempt to interfere with the memorial services by opponents of the coalition; and (ii) a belief that the coalition’s use of the facility for a memorial service would hamper the other uses of the facility, specifically its use as a wedding hall.  Although the Court indicated that the constitutionally protected freedom of assembly may be inappropriately limited if denial of application for use of a public facility is not supported by definable reasons, the Court did not specifically rule on the constitutional issue, simply holding that the municipal authorities had misinterpreted the applicable municipal regulation.  The denial of the coalition’s application based on the cited regulation required more than the municipal authorities’ subjective impression of the likelihood of a disturbance, but an objective expectation based on concrete evidence.  In the Court’s view, it did not appear likely that those opposing the appellant coalition would seek to disrupt the memorial proceedings that were planned.  Moreover, even if such a disturbance seemed likely, the denial of an application for use of public facilities based on a danger that those opposing the applicant would seek to interfere with the proceedings are limited to circumstances in which it is expected that such a disturbance could not be avoided by arranging for security or police protection.  The municipal authorities’ contention regarding interference with the other activities at the facility also lacked merit insofar as the facility had been built for multiple uses and had been used for both wedding and funeral ceremonies in the past.  The first floor of the facility had a separate entrance from the other floors to accommodate this dual use and the facility had been careful not to schedule these events so as to occur simultaneously.

Supreme Court Third Petty Bench Decision of March 19, 1996, 50 Minshu 3-615, 1571 Hanji 16.  The Court reversed in part and remanded in part a decision of the Fukuoka High Court (Fukuoka High Court Decision of April 24, 1992 1421 Hanji 3) regarding the legality of political contributions by the Minami Kyushu Tax Specialists Association ("MKTSA").  The MKTSA had passed a resolution by a majority vote of its members requiring each member pay a special membership fee of 5,000 yen as a political contribution on behalf of the MKTSA to the Minami Kyushu Prefectural Political Committee.  The appellant, a member of the MKTSA, had refused to pay the special membership fee and, as a result, was prohibited from standing as a candidate or voting in MKTSA elections.  The appellant sought nullification of the requirement of payment of the special membership fee and damages.  The Court ruled that, since, as a matter of law, membership in the MKTSA is obligatory for all tax specialists within the jurisdiction of the organization, its members presumably hold various beliefs, values and political views which may not be necessarily consistent with those of the MKTSA or other members.  As political contributions are a means of expressing political views, the MKTSA’s imposition of a requirement of political contribution of its members amounts to a violation of each member’s freedom of expression.  The provision of monetary support to political organizations is better addressed by each member individually through their participation in the public election process.

Supreme Court Third Petty Bench Decision of August 29, 1997, 51 Minshu 7-2921, 1623 Hanji 49, 958 Hanta 65. Ending the so-called Ienaga III Litigation, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the lower court's partial approval of the plaintiff author's contentions regarding the constitutionality of the Ministry of Education ("MOE") textbook review process and claims for damages for mental anguish suffered as a result of determinations made by the MOE regarding the plaintiff's textbook.  In 1980, pursuant to School Education Law Article 21(1), the plaintiff had resubmitted a high school Japanese history text for review by the Ministry of Education and received various requests for revisions.  The plaintiff himself submitted revisions in 1982, and in 1983, the MOE granted conditional acceptance of the textbook subject to 84 suggested corrections, including suggested revisions to 24 areas including those relating to the "Somotai," the "Nanking Incident" and "Atrocities of the Japanese Army." The Court agreed with the lower court in finding the text book review process within the reasonable and necessary scope of the MOE authority to review the contents of textbooks and did not violate Article 26 or Education Basic Law Article 10 relating to equal treatment and did not result in an unreasonable limitation on freedom of speech or academic freedom under Articles 21 and 23 of the Constitution.  However, the Court agreed with the lower court that the three suggested revisions were outside the standard for textbook review by the lower court, and added that the suggested revisions with respect to "Unit 731" were also inappropriate.  The MOE may propose revisions only with respect to "errors difficult to overlook" in the context of  generally understood academic and scholastic standards.

Osaka High Court Decision of September 27, 1996, 47 Gyoshu 9-957, 931 Hanta 188.  The Court reversed a lower court decision affirming the refusal of the Governor of Hyogo to release to a patient a medical clinic’s request for reimbursement for medical services provided to the patient (Kobe District Court Decision of November 27, 1995).  The appellants, brought claims against a married couple, had lost a child during childbirth in 1993, and had subsequently the responsible physician and the clinic at which he worked for medical negligence.  As the plaintiffs’ medical chart produced by the clinic did not yield any significant evidence of negligence, the plaintiffs sought, pursuant to the prefectural regulations regarding disclosure of public information disclosure of the clinic’s request for reimbursement of medical costs submitted to the Hyogo prefectural government, which contained a detailed description of the medical services provided. The Governor of Hyogo had refused disclosure of the description of medical services based on Article 8(1) of the prefectural disclosure regulations which provided an exception to disclosure for materials relating to the health and medical conditions of individuals which contain information which individuals do not typically wish to be disclosed to others.  The lower court agreed, contending that the purpose of the Article 8(1) exception was to prohibit disclosure of individual information regardless of identity of the person requesting such information.  While the lower court acknowledged an individual right to disclosure of personal information from the state, the absence of any prefectural statutory authority establishing this right prevented disclosure in this case.  The Court reversed, stating that Article 8(1) was to be read as a narrow exception to the overall policy goal of full disclosure of information.  Reliance on the statutory language to prohibit the disclosure of personal information concerning the person requesting the disclosure was to inappropriately place form over substance and to frustrate the purpose of the disclosure regulations themselves.

Tokyo High Court Decision of March 10, 1999, 1677 Hanji 22. The Court reversed a lower court decision (Maibashi District Court Decision of December 3, 1996) which had confirmed the nullity of a financial obligation stemming from a resolution of the Gunma Association of Judicial Scriveners ("Association") to provide financial assistance to members of the Hyogo Association of Judicial Scriveners who had been victims of the Hanshin earthquake. The resolution had been adopted by a majority of the Association’s members at a special general meeting and provided for an assessment of 50 yen for each registration application of members. The plaintiff, an Association member, had challenged the resolution as outside the scope of the Association’s authority in light of the fact that the Association is a "compulsory association" insofar as membership is required to act as a judicial scrivener under the Judicial Scrivener Act. The Court acknowledged that, as a compulsory organization, the Association’s membership naturally held divergent political and religious views, and that the Association’s authority to compel its members to take any action which may have political or religious overtones is limited even where adopted by a majority vote. Whether or not such a resolution is appropriate depends on the nature of the proposed action, including whether or not it is consistent with the established purposes and policies of the Association and the nature of its impact on members, including its impact on members’ freedom to hold or express particular political or religious views. In this case, the mere fact of an obligatory contribution by members does not necessarily imply the pursuit of a particular political or religious agenda or an expression political or religious view and lies well within the scope of the Association’s authority. As for the impact of the resolution at issue on Association members, the Court found the financial impact nominal, and although, by its nature, the resolution places some limitations on members’ freedom of expression, the limits are minor and cannot be said to amount to interference with such freedom. Finding the resolution and its adoption within the scope of the authority of the Association, the Court found the determination of the method of collection of funds by means of compulsory payment by members similarly within the authority of the Association.