|
Voting Rights/Election System
Supreme
Court Third Petty Bench Decision of February 28, 1995, 49 Minshu 2-639,
1523 Hanji 49. The Court affirmed a lower court's refusal to permit the plaintiffs,
Korean nationals with permanent resident status, to be listed on voter regulation rolls
and participate in local elections. While acknowledging that the constitutional right to
vote in such elections applied solely to Japanese nationals, the Court, in dicta,
supported the drafting of legislation to allow foreign residents in Japan the right to
vote in local elections.
Supreme
Court Second Petty Bench Decision of March 24, 1995, 1526 Hanji 87. The
Court found a ratio of approximately one to two in the relative weight of votes cast for
Tokyo Metropolitan City Council members during the 1993 Tokyo Metropolitan City Council
elections constitutional. The ratio was based on a comparison of the relative weight of
votes within Chiyoda Ward.
Supreme
Court First Petty Bench Decision of May 25, 1995, 49 Minshu 5-1279, 1531 Hanji
3, 878 Hanta 63. The Court reversed a lower court decision (Tokyo High Court
Decision of November 29, 1994, 1513 Hanji 60) which had questioned the validity
of a political party's expulsion of one of its members and the resulting removal of the
member's name from the list of party representatives appointed to represent the party in
accordance with the proportional representation election system. Recognizing the broad
autonomy of political parties, the Court held that the formulation of the list of party
representatives lay solely within the jurisdiction of the party and that the fact that the
electorate had been provided with the list upon its determination of the extent of the
party's representation in the Diet did not undermine the party's power to adopt
regulations allowing for alteration of the list following the election.
Supreme
Court First Petty Bench Decision of June 8, 1995, 49 Minshu 6-1443,1538 Hanji
185. The Court affirmed a lower court's determination that the proportional weight of
votes during the House of Representatives general election of July 1993 of as much as
1(Tokyo Seventh District) to 2.82 (Ehime Third District) did not violate the Article 14 of
the Constitution as, at the time of the election, the relative inequality in voting rights
did not exceed the reasonable discretional limit of the Diet. Two justices dissented with
the determination of constitutionality, although they concurred in supporting the validity
of the election.
Supreme
Court Grand Bench Decision of September 11, 1996, 50-8 Minshu 2283, 1582 Hanji
3, 922 Hanta 96. The Court dismissed appeals brought by both parties from a
determination of the Osaka High Court (Osaka High Court Decision of December 16, 1993,
1501 Hanji 83) in favor of the plaintiffs, a group of Osaka voters, who sought a
declaration that the July 26, 1992 House of Councilors election was unconstitutional
insofar as the proportional relationship between votes was, at its greatest, 1 (Tottori
Prefecture) to 6.59 (Kanagawa Prefecture). The Osaka High Court's finding of
unconstitutionality was the first such finding with respect to a House of Councilors
election. While, the Court unanimously affirmed that the degree of proportional
difference between the votes had reached an unconstitutional level, an eight judge
majority determined the election was not ultimately unconstitutional as the Diet must be
permitted a reasonable period of time to correct such imbalances, and this period had not
yet expired. The Public Elections Law was amended in 1994 (after the Osaka High
Court determination but before publication of the Supreme Court opinion) in part to
address these proportional differences.
Supreme
Court First Petty Bench Decision of March 13, 1997, 51-3 Minshu 453,
1605 Hanji 16, 944 Hanta 83. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's
appeal from a lower court decision (Sendai High Court Decision of July 8, 1996, 49 Minshu
2-38) upholding the constitutionality of Article 251-3(1) of the Public Elections Law, the
so-called "guilt by association" provision. The plaintiff was elected to
the Aomori Prefectural Assembly in April 9, 1994, but was subsequently removed from office
and prohibited from candidacy for a period of five (5) years as a result of illegal
activities undertaken by leaders of the plaintiff's election committee found to be in
violation of Article 221-1(1) of the Public Elections Law. Article 251-3(1) of the
Public Elections Law provides for the individual liability of a candidate for failure to
prevent activities of leaders of his or her election committee which illegally undermine
the fairness and propriety of public elections. The Court found the
legislative purpose of Article 251-3(1) rational and the means by which this legislative
purpose is achieved reasonable and necessary.
Supreme
Court Second Petty Bench Decision of March 28, 1997, 1602 Hanji 71, 939 Hanta
98. The Court dismissed the appeal from a lower court decision (Osaka High Court
Decision of September 11, 1992, 39 Sogetsu 6) denying the plaintiffs claims
that an order compelling production of their voting records to the police as part of its
investigation of alleged election crimes violated Article 15(4) of the Constitution
relating to the secrecy of ballots. The police were investigating allegations that a
candidate and a number of his supporters had falsified voter registration forms and voting
ballots in order to secure the candidate a seat on the municipal council. As the
records of the polling locations were inadequate to assess whether or not the ballots
themselves had in fact been falsified, the police requested and were awarded discovery of
226 ballots voted in favor of the candidate. The plaintiffs included the candidate
and a number of voters not implicated by the investigation. The Court
determined that as the sole purpose of the compelled production of the voting ballots was
the comparison of fingerprints on the ballots with those of the supporters suspected of
election crimes and that the plaintiffs' fingerprints were not among those used in this
comparison, there was little danger that the contents of the plaintiffs' voting ballots
would be disclosed. Accordingly, even if the secrecy of the plaintiffs ballots could
be interpreted to have been violated, there was little danger of actual harm to the
plaintiffs or their legal rights stemming from such invasion.
Supreme Court Second Petty Bench Decision of March 13, 1998,
(Unpublished). The Court dismissed the appeal of a political group of foreign residents of
Japan and the group's individual representative, a third generation Korean with permanent
residency status in Japan. The political group and its representative had brought suit
against the election commission alleging violation of Article 15(1) of the Constitution
for failure to accept the registration of ten members of the political group as well as
that of the group's representative for candidacy in the July 1992 House of Councilors
representative elections, and Osaka municipal elections. The group members as well as the
group's representative, had attached their foreign resident certificates to their
application of candidacy. In each case, the electoral board had refused to accept the
plaintiffs' registration as candidates based on the regulatory requirement that
registrations be accompanied by a copy of the citizen's registry or a summary thereof. The
Court affirmed the lower court's determination that neither Article 10(1) of the Public
Elections Law, which stipulates only Japanese citizens have the right to participate in
elections, nor any of the other provisions raised by the plaintiffs violate Article 15(1)
of the Constitution, which provides the people the right to select public officials, nor
Article 25 of the International Treaty on Human Rights.
Supreme Court Grand Bench Decision of September 2, 1998,
52 Minshu 6-1373, 1653 Hanji 31, 985 Hanta 79. The Court
dismissed the appeal of a group of voters in Tokyo and three neighboring districts, one of
many actions seeking nullification of the July 1995 House of Councilors election, the
first election following the 1994 redistribution of parliamentary seats among electoral
districts. In 1994, the 152 seats of the 252 seats of the House of Councilors allocated to
various voting districts were redistributed to better reflect shifts in population and
remedy a difference in the relative voting power between the least and most populous
voting districts which had risen to 6.48 to one based on the 1990 census. The 1994
revisions ultimately culminated in the reallocation of four seats among seven voting
districts, reducing the difference in the relative voting power between the least and most
populous districts to 4.81 to one during the 1995 election. The plaintiffs had sought
nullification of the election, alleging that, as the 1994 reallocation had failed to fully
remedy the difference in voting power among the various districts, it violated Article
14(1) of the Constitution. Agreeing with the Tokyo High Court (Tokyo High Court
Decision of February 6, 1997), the majority of the Court affirmed dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claim, stating that the determination of the structure of the election system
lay within the broad discretion of the Diet, and that the decrease in discrepancy in
relative voting power to 4.81 to one as a result of the 1994 revisions did not create
inequality at a level which required judicial interference with legislative discretion.
Supreme Court Third Petty Bench Decision of November 17, 1998, 1662 Hanji
74, 991 Hanta 100. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal from a lower
court decision upholding the constitutionality of the 1994 amendments to Article 251-3(1)
of the Public Elections Law, the so-called "guilt by association" provision
(Tokyo High Court Decision of . In the October 1996 single constituency elections in
Wakayama's Third District, the plaintiff, Minoru Noda, had failed to win a seat in the
House of Representatives, but later succeeded in being elected to the Diet under the
proportional representation system as a member of the Liberal Democratic Party's Kinki
Block. However, it was later discovered that an employee of the plaintiff's political
support group, had, in the course of the election, distributed approximately 100,000 yen
in exchange for votes for the plaintiff and his party in violation of Article 221-1(1) of
the Public Elections Law. Viewing the employee as a "de facto" political
secretary of the plaintiff, prosecutors then sought, pursuant to the "guilt by
association" provisions of Article 251 of Public Election Law, nullification of the
election of the plaintiff and a prohibition from future candidacy for a period of five (5)
years. As amended, Article 251-3(1) of the Public Elections Law provides for the
individual liability of a candidate for failure to prevent activities of leaders of his or
her election committee, including political secretaries and campaign participants, which
illegally undermine the fairness and propriety of public elections. The Court unanimously
upheld the lower court's determination that the nature of the duties of the employee at
issue did not materially differ from those of a political secretary and therefore fell
within the definition of Article 251(2)(1) of those to whose activities give rise to
liability under the "guilt by association" provisions, and that the "guilt
by association" provisions themselves do not violate the people's right to select
their representatives under Article 15(1) of the Constitution and the right to due process
under Article 31 of the Constitution.
Supreme Court Second Petty Bench Decision of January 22, 1999, 1666 Hanji
33, 994 Hanta 101. The Court dismissed a direct appeal from the Tokyo District
Court by a group of voters who sought nullification of the July 6, 1997 Tokyo General
Assembly election, alleging that retention of Chiyoda Ward Election District as a Special
Election District violated Article 271(2) and Article 15(2) of the Public Elections Law
and that the allocation of representatives to fixed populations violated Public Election
Law Article 15(8). Based on the results of the 1995 census, the Tokyo Assembly, pursuant
to municipal regulations which provided the Assembly with discretion to designate
particular geographical areas as Special Election Districts based on unique political and
geographical circumstances which necessitated a variance in the ratio of assembly seats to
district population applicable to other districts, designated Chiyoda Ward as a Special
Election District in light of its role as a national political and economic center. The
plaintiffs alleged that the Assembly had exceeded the scope of its discretion in its
designation of Chiyoda Ward as a Special Election District as at the time of the 1997
election, the ratio between Assembly seats and population in Chiyoda Ward was .375.
Previous case law had suggested that a ratio of less than .500 removed a presumption that
designation of a Special Election District was an exercise of the rational discretion of
the Assembly. In the 1997 election, the disparity in voting power among the other election
districts, excluding Chiyoda Ward as a Special Election District, was at its largest, 2.15
to one. Inclusion of Chiyoda Ward increased the overall disparity in voting power among
election districts to 3.95 to one. Agreeing with the district court, the Court found the
Assembly's designation of Chiyoda Ward as a Special Election District within the exercise
of the Assembly's reasonable discretion, and the disparity in voting power among the
various election districts stemming from the allocation of Assembly seats among election
districts as not of a degree to suggest the Assembly had exceeded the scope of its
discretionary authority and not in violation of Public Election Law Article 18.
Supreme Court Grand Bench Decision of November 10, 1999, (1) 53 Minshu
8-1577, 1696 Hanji 48, Hanta 114, (2) 53 Minshu 8-1704, 1696 Hanji
46, 1018 Hanta 114. The Court simultaneously dismissed approximately 31 appeals
of citizen groups from lower court decisions denying claims for nullification of the House
of Representatives election of October 20, 1996 including the proportional representation
elections in the Tokyo Election District (Tokyo High Court Decision October 9, 1998)
and the small constituency election in Tokyo Election District No. 5 (Tokyo High Court
Decision October 10, 1998) as violating Article 14(1) of the Constitution. Under the
election reforms of 1994 (Public Election Law, as amended), the so-called medium-size
constituency system was replaced with a dual system consisting of so-called small
constituency elections and proportional representation elections. Under the small
constituency system, 300 of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives were allocated
to a nationwide system of single seat election districts, consisting of one seat for each
of the 47 prefectures and the remaining seats to each of an additional 253 separate
election districts, each seat going to the candidate from each prefecture or small
election district with the greatest number of votes. Under the proportional representation
system, the remaining 200 seats of the House of Representatives were allocated among
eleven nationwide constituencies, and qualified political parties each submit a slate of
candidates for the number of seats allocated to each constituency. Voters do not select
candidates, but vote in favor of a political party. The number of seats allocated to each
constituency are then divided among the political parties based their proportional share
of the votes obtained. The small constituency elections and the proportional
representation elections occur simultaneously, with each citizen possessing one vote for
each election. Candidates may simultaneously participate in both the single constituency
elections and the proportional representation elections, but cannot be elected under both
systems.
(1) With respect to the proportional election system, the plaintiffs alleged that
allowing candidates to participate in both elections violated Articles 43(1), 14(1), 15(3)
and 44 of the Constitution, as candidates who lost in the single constituency elections
could nonetheless win a seat in the proportional representation election. Moreover, as the
system limits the participation of candidates not affiliated with political parties
qualified to participate in the proportional representation elections and political
parties not so qualified, it infringes on voters' rights in violation of Articles 15(1),
44, 14(1), 47, and 43(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that
since the candidate list is not fixed at the time of election, the proportional
representation election is not a direct election and therefore in violation of Articles
43(1) and 15 of the Constitution. In a unanimous opinion, the Court noted that while the
Constitution provides for the establishment of a representative democracy and requires
members of the Diet represent all the people, (Arts. 43 and 47), it leaves the actual
process and mechanism of election of members of both houses to the broad discretion of the
Diet. Accordingly, a system of election may only be set aside when its structure places it
outside the Diet's discretionary authority or clearly in violation of the Constitution. In
this case, the Court found that allowing candidates affiliated with political parties
meeting specific qualifications (Public Election Law Article 86-2) to be elected under the
proportional representation system even if they have lost in the single constituency
elections within the broad discretionary power of the Diet. Although Article 87 of the
Public Election Law prohibits dual candidacy in principle, Article 86(2)(4) provides an
exception for the purpose of elections based primarily on political parties. Accordingly,
the Court found the Diet's adoption of the system of dual candidacy not in violation of
the Constitution. Similarly, the fact the participation in both elections is limited to
affiliated candidates and qualified political parties cannot be regarded as outside the
discretionary power granted to the Diet or an unjust restriction on the freedom to stand
for election or the right to exercise voting rights. Finally, the Court noted that a
system in which voters select political parties which are in turn required to submit in
advance a list of candidates and the order in which these candidates should be chosen, and
the successful candidates are determined in the order of the list in accordance with the
number of the votes which each political party has obtained is not materially different
from a system in which the voter directly chooses an individual candidate, in that
successful candidates are determined by the general will of the voters. Accordingly, the
Court found the proportional representation system not in violation of the constitutional
requirement of direct elections.
(2) With respect to the small constituency elections, the plaintiffs alleged that the
criteria for the establishment of the small constituencies regards the members of the
House of Representatives from small constituencies to be representatives of the locality,
and therefore are in violation of Article 43(1) of the Constitution. The plaintiffs also
assert the demarcation of constituency boundaries in accordance with this criterion has
resulted in 28 constituencies in which the difference in the numbers of population is more
than double of other constituencies, in violation of Article 14(1) of the Constitution.
There were two principle criteria for setting the boundaries of the small constituencies.
First, the populations of each constituency were to be proportional so that the
relationship between the between the least populated constituency and most populated
constituency should be less than 1:2, although administrative division, geography,
transportation and other circumstances may be taken into account. Second, seats were to be
allocated to each of the 47 prefectures prior to the demarcation of the boundaries of the
small constituencies and the number of constituencies within each prefecture determined by
subtracting the number of prefectures from the number of the members of the House of
Representatives and allocated to each prefecture in proportion to its population plus one.
Thus, while demarcation was designed to approximate a direct relationship between
population and representation, the criteria established contemplated that a certain amount
of imbalance is inevitable. The demarcation applicable to the election in question was
based on the national census of October 1990, and resulted in a maximum difference in
population between constituencies of 1: 2.137. The national census immediately before the
election in October 1995 resulted in a maximum difference in population between
constituencies of 1:2.30 (Shimane No. 3: Kanagawa No. 14). However, the majority of the
Court found that, although the difference between constituencies was greater than 1:2,
even at the outset, the challenged demarcation was not outside the established criteria.
The criteria specifically allow for the appropriate consideration of other factors which
may impact the creation of a direct relationship between population and representation.
Indeed, the requirement that seats be allocated to each of the prefectures in advance of
demarcation of small constituencies clearly contributes to an imbalance in the value of
votes in various constituencies, but stems from an appropriate concern that residents of
sparsely populated prefectures continue to have their views reflected in national
politics. In light of these considerations, the majority found the resulting difference in
the value of votes between constituencies not to have reached the level of
unreasonableness in general, and therefore, not in violation of Article 14(1) of the
Constitution. Nor, in the majority's opinion, could the criteria themselves be considered
unconstitutional or the Diet's adoption of the criteria and the demarcation based on them
outside the exercise of its reasonable discretion. Finally, with respect to plaintiffs'
claims regarding Article 43(1) of the Constitution, the majority found that the provision
that members of the Diet represent all people means that members of both houses of the
Diet, regardless of the method of election, are representatives of all people and not
representatives of a specific class, party, or locality, and are mandated to act for all
people in an independent way without being bound by instructions of a particular class of
voters and cannot be understood to require an election system strictly proportional to the
numbers of population. Simply because the allocation of seats to each prefecture prior to
allocation to small constituencies results in more seats allocated to less populated
prefectures, members elected under this system do not lose the characteristic of being
representatives of all people. |